FIRST- AND THIRD-PERSON APPROACHES:
THE PROBLEM OF INTEGRATION
Olga MarkičFaculty of Arts - University of Ljubljana
|INDECS 10(3), 213-222, 2012
Full text available here.
Received: 21 September 2012
The author discusses the problem of integration of first- and third-person approaches in studying the human mind. She critically evaluates and compares various methodologies for studying and explaining conscious experience. Common strategies that apply reductive explanation seem to be unsatisfied for explaining experience and its subjective character. There were attempts to explain experience from the first-person point of view (introspectionism, philosophical phenomenology) but the results were not intersubjectively verifiable. Dennett proposed heterophenomenology as a scientifically viable alternative which supposed to bridge the gap between first- and third-person perspectives. The author critically evaluates his proposal and compares it to contemporary attempts to provide first-person methods.
cognitive science, heterophenomenology, consciousness, experience, explanation
APA: 2340, 2380
JEL: D83, D84, Z10