In this article we critically examine Vargas's revisionistic theory about free will. Contrary to his claim that there is no empirical evidence for libertarian freedom of the will, we expose empirical results from Schultze-Kraft et al. experiment. We interpret these findings by invoking non-causal and agent-causal libertarianism. According to this, we conclude that Vargas's revisionistic theory that recommends that those who hold libertarianistic commonsense view should revise it towards compatibilism is not warranted and that those who hold libertarianistic commonsense view should retain it; moreover, those who hold compatibilistic or deterministic commonsense views on free will should revise them towards libertarianism.

KEY WORDS
revisionistic theory, free will, libertarianism, revisionism

CLASSIFICATION

APA:	2380, 2630
JEL:	G41