DEEP LEARNING IN SCIENCE:
IS THERE A REASON FOR
(PHILOSOPHICAL) PESSIMISM?
Martin Justin
University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy Received: 27th May 2023. ABSTRACT In this article, I will review existing arguments for and against this philosophical pessimism about using deep learning
models in science. Despite the remarkable results achieved by deep learning models networks in various scientific fields, some philosophers worry that
because of their opacity, using these systems cannot improve our understanding of the phenomena studied. First, some terminological and conceptual
clarification is provided. Then, I present a case for optimism, arguing that using opaque models does not hinder the possibility of gaining new
understanding. After that, I present a critique of this argument. Finally, I present a case for pessimism, concluding that there are reasons to be
pessimistic about the ability of deep learning models to provide us with new understanding of phenomena, studied by scientists. KEY WORDS CLASSIFICATION
Ljubljana, Slovenia
INDECS 22(1), 59-70, 2024
DOI 10.7906/indecs.22.1.3
Full text available in
pdf format.
Accepted: 5th February 2024.
Regular article
deep learning, scientific understanding, explanation, black box problem, artificial neural networks
JEL: O33